the forces of democracy must counter this violence of sovereignty but not as its polar opposite in symmetrical fashion.

The new possibilities for democracy are confronted by the obstacle of war. As we saw in part 1, our contemporary world is characterized by a generalized, permanent global civil war by the constant threat of violence that effectively suspends democracy. Not only does the permanent state of war suspend democracy infinitely; the existence of new pressures and possibilities of democracy are answered by the soverign powers with war. War acts as mechanism of containment. As the balance tips in the relationship of soverignity, every nondemocratic power

tends to need war and violence as its basis. The modern relationship between politics and war has thus been inverted. War is no lohas thus been invertednger an instrument at the disposal of political powers to be used in limited instances, but rather war itself tends to define the foundation of the political system. War tends to become a form of rule. This shift is reflected, as we argued in part 1, in the mechanisms of the legitimation of violence employed by the soverign powers. Violence tends no longer to be legitimated on the basis of legal structures or even moral principles. Rather the lgitimation of violence tends only to come after the fact, based on the effect of the violence, its capacities to create and maintain order. From this perspective too we can see that the modern order of priority has been reversed: violence comes first as basis and political or moral negotiation follows on its results. The emergence of the possibilities of democracy has forced sovereignty to adopt ever purer forms of domination and violence.